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Abstract
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with submodular valuations that provides m
1
2
−ǫ approximation to the social welfare and uses value
queries only must use exponentially many value queries, where m is the number of items. In con-
trast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our
approach is based on a novel direct hardness approach and completely skips the notoriously hard
characterization step. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility
results in algorithmic mechanism design so far.
We demonstrate two additional applications of our new technique: (1) an impossibility result for
universally-truthful polynomial time flexible combinatorial public projects and (2) an impossibility
result for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects. The latter
is the first result that bounds the power of polynomial-time truthful in expectation mechanisms in
any setting.
1 Introduction
This paper attempts to answer one of the earliest open questions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design:
is there a truthful computationally-efficient mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular
bidders that provides a constant approximation ratio?
In a combinatorial auction there is a set M , |M | = m of items, and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of
bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R+, which is normalized (vi(0) = 0) and
non-decreasing. An important special case is when each valuation is submodular : for every item j and
bundles S and T , S ⊆ T , v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ). The definition captures valuations
that exhibit “decreasing marginal utilities”. The goal is to maximize the social welfare, i.e., to find an
allocation (S1, . . . , Sn) that maximizes Σivi(Si). As in previous work, we would like our algorithms
to run in time polynomial in the natural parameters of the problems, n and m. Since the valuation
function is an object of exponential size, we assume that each valuation v is given to us as a black
box that can only answer value queries: given S, return the value of v(S).
The main interest of this paper is in incentive-compatible algorithms that handle the selfish behav-
ior of the bidders. We are interested in designing truthful algorithms in which the profit-maximizing
strategy of each bidder is to reveal his true valuation (i.e., truthfully answer the queries).
the problem has received a lot of attention, even from a pure optimization point of view, completely
ignoring incentives. The most notable result here is Vondrak’s celebrated algorithm [27] that provides
an approximation ratio of e
e−1 , improving over the 2-approximation of the greedy algorithm [21]. This
ratio is the best possible with a polynomial number of value queries [18, 23]. While value queries
are widely used in the design of algorithms for other optimization scenarios that involve submodular
functions (see, e.g., [17, 16, 14]), back in the combinatorial auctions setting, other algorithms guarantee
improved approximation ratios using the stronger demand queries (given prices p1, . . . , pm, return a
bundle that maximizes v(S) − Σj∈Spj). The state of the art in this setting is an ( ee−1 − 10−4)-
approximation algorithm [15], an improvement over the e
e−1 -approximation algorithm of [12].
Much less is known regarding the design of truthful algorithms for this problem. The VCG mecha-
nism is a truthful algorithm for the problem, but requires computing the optimal solution and thus is
not computable in polynomial time. The best known polynomial time deterministic algorithm provides
a poor approximation ratio of O(
√
m) [10]. Whether this ratio is the best possible with deterministic
truthful polynomial-time algorithms is the subject of the current paper. If we provide the algorithm
designer with more power and allow the use of both randomization and the strictly more powerful
demand queries, an O(logm log logm)-truthful approximation algorithm exists [6, 11]. Unfortunately,
despite all progress made over the years, the algorithmic mechanism design community is unable to
answer the question posed by Lehmann, Lehmann, and Nisan [21] back in 2001: is there a truthful
polynomial-time O(1)-approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders?
1.1 Previous Technique: Characterize and Optimize
Roughly speaking, problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design are either single parameter or multi-
parameter. Single parameter problems, where the private information of each player consists of es-
sentially one number, are quite well understood: an algorithm is truthful if and only if it is monotone
(see [24]). This characterization gives rise to many truthful algorithms with approximation ratios that
match what is achievable by the best non-truthful polynomial time mechanisms (e.g., [22, 2, 4]).
Combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders belong to the harder class of multi-parameter
problems. In this class, the private information of each player consists of more than one parameter (for
example, in combinatorial auctions the private information of a bidder consists of exponentially many
values of bundles). Since the current best approximation ratios achievable by truthful polynomial time
mechanisms are usually quite far from what can be obtained from a pure algorithmic point of view that
ignores incentives, great effort was and is invested in proving impossibility results. The main obstacle in
1
proving these impossibilities is the hardness of obtaining useful characterizations for multi-parameter
domains. Specifically, all known impossibility results on the power of computationally-efficient truthful
mechanisms are proved using the following two-stage paradigm:
1. Characterize all truthful mechanisms for the setting, ignoring computational issues.
2. Optimize over all truthful algorithms: i.e., show a lower bound on the approximation ratio of
the best computationally efficient mechanism characterized in the previous step.
This paradigm was quite successful in obtaining impossibilities for problems with “full dimension-
ality” [19, 13, 25]: in the first characterization step, it is shown that all truthful mechanisms for the
problems are VCG-based (a slight generalization of the VCG mechanism), regardless of their approx-
imation ratio – thereby extending Roberts’ theorem [26]1. The second optimization step shows that
VCG-based algorithms cannot provide a good approximation ratio in polynomial time.
For combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations, the optimization step was accomplished
in [8] where it was shown that every VCG-based m
1
6 -approximation mechanism requires exponential
communication. However, completing the characterization step is notoriously hard for auction domains
and, in general, domains that do not exhibit externalities: in these domains it is easy to construct
truthful mechanisms that are not VCG-based (but these mechanisms can guarantee at best a trivial
approximation ratio). Furthermore, as [9] shows, there are non-VCG-based mechanisms that guarantee
arbitrarily good approximation ratios2! Till now, [9] is the only example of a successful characterization
of truthful mechanisms for a multi-parameter auction domain, and even there the extra assumption
of scalability is needed. Moreover, the characterization of multi-unit auctions of [9] holds only for two
bidders. While this suffices for obtaining an optimal inapproximability result for multi-unit auctions,
an optimal result for combinatorial auctions probably requires characterization of mechanisms for
many bidders. This task seems to be quite difficult: we do not even have a good conjecture of what
the class of mechanisms with good approximation ratios might be3.
1.2 Our Results: Impossibilities via Direct Hardness
This paper introduces a simple technique for bounding the power of truthful mechanisms. The tech-
nique is very different from the characterize-and-optimize approach, and in particular does not require
obtaining characterizations of truthful mechanisms at all. The starting point is the taxation principle:
consider some player i, and fix the valuations of all other players. According to the taxation principle,
in a truthful algorithm each bundle S has a price pS (possibly∞) and bidder i is assigned the bundle
that maximizes his profit v(S) − pS. We call this set of bundles and prices the menu of player i.
We show that in any algorithm that provides a good approximation there exist valuations such that
some bidder faces a “large” menu with a “nice” structure. We then prove that selecting the profit
maximizing bundle in the menu – a must according to the taxation principle – requires exponentially
many value queries. This leads us to the statement of our main result:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with
submodular bidders that provides an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0. Then, A
makes exponentially many value queries.
Notice that our result holds not only for deterministic mechanisms but also for universally truthful
mechanisms (i.e., a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms). This is yet
another benefit of skipping the characterization step and using our direct hardness approach.
1Roberts [26] shows that if the domain of valuations is unrestricted then every truthful algorithm is VCG-based.
2But these mechanisms (for multi-unit auctions) are not computationally efficient.
3The problem is even more acute for randomized mechanisms: characterizations of truthful randomized mechanisms
are probably an impossible task using our current techniques.
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1.2.1 Flexible Combinatorial Public Projects
We then proceed to show the applicability of our techniques in other domains. Papadimitriou et al. [25]
presented the combinatorial public project problem. Similarly to a combinatorial auction, there are
m items and n players with monotone and normalized submodular valuations. Unlike combinatorial
auctions the goal is to find a single bundle S of size exactly k that maximizes Σivi(S). A simple
greedy algorithm provides an approximation ratio of e
e−1 for this problem ignoring incentives issues.
Papadimitriou et al. use the characterize-and-optimize approach to show a lower bound of m
1
2
−ǫ
on the approximation ratio of truthful polynomial time algorithms: they first show that all truthful
algorithms for the problem are VCG-based, and then that VCG-based algorithms cannot provide a
good approximation ratio in polynomial time. However, a natural relaxation of the problem allows
outputting bundles of size at most k (the flexible model) rather than bundles of size exactly k (the
exact model). While this relaxation is useless from a pure algorithmic point of view, since the val-
uations are monotone, there might be truthful non-VCG based mechanisms in the flexible domain,
thus bypassing the characterization and impossibility result of [25]4. To the very least, characteriz-
ing truthful mechanisms in the flexible model seem to require new techniques. Our direct hardness
approach allows us to ignore all these complications and obtain the following:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for flexible combinatorial public
projects that provides an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0. Then, A makes
exponentially many value queries.
1.2.2 Hardness of Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms
As there has been only limited success in designing powerful deterministic and universally truthful
mechanisms for many domains, there is a line of research [1, 20, 5, 7] that advocates the use of a relaxed
notion of truthfulness, truthfulness in expectation. In a truthful-in-expectation mechanism, truth
telling maximizes the expected profit, where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins
of the algorithm. Truthfulness in expectation is a reasonable relaxation of deterministic truthfulness,
but one should keep in mind that it should be used only if bidders are known to be risk neutral and
not, for example, risk averse (in contrast to universally truthful mechanisms, see [11] for a discussion).
It is known that truthfulness in expectation is strictly stronger than deterministic truthfulness in some
settings [7]. Can truthfulness in expectation be the remedy for all pitfalls of deterministic truthfulness?
Unfortunately, we give a negative answer:
Theorem: Let A be a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism for exact combinatorial public
projects that provides an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0. Then, A makes
exponentially many value queries.
This is the first lower bound on the power of polynomial time truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in
any setting. We again prove an impossibility without a characterization5 . Yet, exact combinatorial
public projects have a somewhat artificial flavor in our opinion, especially in a randomized setting6.
Unfortunately, we currently do not know how to extend our result, and whether there exists an efficient
truthful-in-expectation mechanism with a good approximation ratio in the flexible model remains an
open question.
4A similar phenomenon exists in multi-unit auctions, where truthful algorithms that always allocate all items must be
VCG-based [13, 19], but without this extra condition the triage mechanisms of [9] are non-VCG based truthful algorithms
that provide a good approximation ratio.
5Nevertheless, it is extremely interesting to obtain a characterization of truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in any
multi-parameter setting. Even in Roberts’ setting [26], where the valuations are completely unrestricted, such a charac-
terization is not known!
6Randomized mechanisms can sometimes take advantage of not allocating all items. See [7] for an example.
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1.3 Open Questions
This paper shows that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with submodular valuations with an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ makes an exponential number of
value queries. This was achieved by introducing a novel approach that allows proving hardness without
characterization. Nevertheless, a full characterization of truthful mechanisms with good approximation
ratio remains an important question, even ignoring computational implications.
If demand queries are allowed, there exists a randomized universally-truthful O(logm log logm)-
approximation algorithm [6]. Is there an m
1
2
−ǫ deterministic algorithm that uses a polynomial num-
ber of demand queries? A truthful-in-expectation O(1)-approximation mechanism that uses demand
queries, or even a universally truthful one? Another open question is to prove hardness results that
are based on computational complexity rather than on concrete complexity, for, say, the budget ad-
ditive case (see [25, 3]). These questions remain open, but we do believe that a refinement of our
direct-hardness technique might be capable of making significant progress in providing answers.
Paper Organization
Section 2 is the preliminaries section. Section 3 contains our main result: an impossibility result for
truthful polynomial time combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. The subject of Section
4 is an impossibility result for combinatorial public projects. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss truthful
in expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Settings
2.1.1 Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
In a combinatorial auction there is a set M , |M | = m of items, and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders.
Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R+, which is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and non-
decreasing. We assume that the valuations are submodular: a valuation v is submodular if it exhibits
decreasing marginal utilities, v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ), for every item j and bundles
S, T , S ⊆ T . Equivalently, v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for every two bundles S and T .
Let V be the set of all submodular valuations. An allocation of the items ~S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is a
vector of pairwise disjoint of subsets of M . Let S be the set of all allocations. The goal is to find an
allocation that maximizes the welfare: Σivi(Si). The valuations are given as black boxes. We assume
that the black box v is accessed only via value queries: given a bundles S, what is v(S). We want our
algorithms to make a polynomial number (in n and m) of value queries to the black boxes.
2.1.2 Combinatorial Public Projects
In a combinatorial public project, as in combinatorial auctions, we also have a set M , |M | = m
of items, and a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of bidders. Similarly, each bidder i has a valuation function
vi : 2
M → R+, which is normalized (vi(∅) = 0), non-decreasing and submodular. The valuations
are given as black boxes that can only answer value queries. In exact combinatorial public projects
(this is the model defined in [25]) the goal is to find a bundle S of size exactly k that maximizes
Σivi(S). In flexible combinatorial public projects we are allowed to output S of size at most k that
maximizes Σivi(S). We are interested in algorithms that make a polynomial number (in n and m) of
value queries.
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2.2 Truthfulness
The reader is referred to [24] for the (standard) proofs missing in this subsection. An n-bidder
mechanism is a pair (A, p) where A : V n → S and p = (p(1), · · · , p(n)), where for each i, p(i) : V n → R.
Definition 2.1 Let (A, p) be a deterministic mechanism. (A, p) is truthful if for all i, all vi, v
′
i and
all v−i we have that vi(A(vi, v−i)i)− p(i)(vi, v−i) ≥ vi(A(v′i, v−i)i)− p(i)(v′i, v−i).
It is well known that an algorithm (for combinatorial auctions or combinatorial public projects)
is truthful if and only if each bidder is presented with a payment for each bundle T that does not
depend on bidder i’s valuation (i.e., p(i) : V n−1 → R). Denote this payment by p(i)T (v−i). Each bidder
is allocated a bundle that maximizes his profit: vi(T )−p(i)T (v−i) (this is called the “taxation principle”
– we will sometimes say that these payments are induced by v−i).
Definition 2.2 (Menu) Fix some algorithm A. The menu of i given v−i in A is
Rv−i = {S|∃vi s.t. A(vi, v−i)i = S}
2.2.1 Randomized Mechanisms
Definition 2.3 (A, p) is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful determin-
istic mechanisms.
Definition 2.4 (A, p) is truthful in expectation if for all i, all vi, v
′
i and all v−i we have that
E[vi(A(vi, v−i)i)−p(vi, v−i)] ≥ E[v′i(A(v′i, v−i)i)−pi(v′i, v−i)], where the expectation is over the internal
random coins of the algorithm.
2.3 Chernoff Bounds
We will use the following version of the chernoff bounds multiple times.
Proposition 2.5 (Chernoff) Let X1, ...Xm be independent random variables that take values in
{0, 1}, such that for all i, Pr[Xi = 1] = p for some p. Then, the following holds, for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1:
1. Pr[ΣiXi > (1 + ǫ)pm] ≤ e−pmǫ2
2. Pr[ΣiXi < (1− ǫ)pm] ≤ e−pmǫ2
3 The Main Result: Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Val-
uations
We start with proving a lower bound on deterministic mechanisms. In the appendix we discuss how
to extend the lower bound to randomized universally truthful algorithms (Theorem A.1).
Theorem 3.1 Let A be a deterministic truthful n10 -approximation mechanism for combinatorial auc-
tions with submodular valuations. Then, A makes at least e
m
n2
10n2·m6 value queries.
In particular, for any constant ǫ > 0 and n = m
1
2
−ǫ, we get that A must make exponential number
of value queries to achieve an approximation ratio of O(m
1
2
−ǫ).
The proof shows that for some vi and some valuations of the other bidders v−i, finding the bundle
that maximizes the profit of bidder i vi(S)−pv−i(S) requires exponential number of value queries. The
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proof is divided into two parts. In the first part (Section 3.1) we show that there are valuations v−i
that induce a submenu with “nice” properties. In the second part (Section 3.2) we use the submenu
to define a valuation vi of bidder i such that finding the profit-maximizing bundle for vi requires
exponential number of value queries.
Specifically, the first step shows that for some v−i the menu of bidder i is exponentially large.
This by itself is not enough; the profit-maximizing bundle may be found with only a polynomial
number of value queries even in exponentially large menus. Therefore, we find a “large” submenu
where the bundles’ prices are “almost the same” with the additional property that if a bundle T is
in the submenu, then every other bundle U in the menu that contains T has a “significantly” higher
price. These two properties, together with other easier-to-show properties, enable us to construct a
valuation vi for which finding the profit-maximizing bundle requires exponentially many value queries.
Definition 3.2 (Structured Submenu) A set S ⊆ Rv−i is structured if
• For each S, S′ ∈ S: |pS(v−i)− pS′(v−i)| ≤ 1m5 .
• For all S, T such that S ∈ S, T ∈ Rv−i and T strictly contains S: pT (v−i)− pS(v−i) ≥ 1m3 .
• For all S ∈ S: pS(v−i) ≤ m.
• For each S, S′ ∈ S: |S| = |S′|.
3.1 Existence of Exponentially Large Structured Submenus
Lemma 3.3 Let A be a truthful n10-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with sub-
modular valuations. Then, there exists v−i, S, |S| ≥ e
m
n2
10n2·m6 , such that S ⊆ Rv−i is a structured
submenu.
The proof makes use of the following class of valuations:
Definition 3.4 A valuation v is called polar additive if both of the following conditions hold:
• v is additive.
• For each item j either v({j}) = 1 or v({j}) = 1
m3
.
We show that there exists v−i that consists of polar additive valuations only, and that the induced
menu of v−i contains a structured submenu of at least the specified size. We use the probabilistic
method to prove the existence of such vi. The valuation vi of bidder i is constructed as follows: for
each item j, set independently at random vi(j) = 1 with probability p =
1
n
, or vi(j) =
1
m3
with
probability 1 − p. We call valuations constructed this way random. We say that item j is demanded
by bidder i if vi({j}) = 1.
Definition 3.5 Fix bidder i and v−i, where each v ∈ v−i is polar additive. Let Sv−i = {S|∃ a polar-
additive valuation vi s.t. A(vi, v−i)i = S}.
Claim 3.6 Fix v−i, and let S ∈ Sv−i. Then,
1. pv−i(S) ≤ m.
2. For each S ⊆ T such that T ∈ Rv−i we have that pv−i(T ) ≥ pv−i(S) + 1m3 .
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Proof: The first property holds since otherwise bidder i with valuation vi has negative profit for S
and thus prefers the empty bundle (which has a profit of zero). The second property holds since the
marginal value of every item in a polar additive valuation is at least 1
m3
. Thus, if the price difference
between S and T is less than 1
m3
, then S /∈ Rv−i .
Claim 3.7 Pr[the number of items demanded by at least one bidder > (1− 1.01(1 − p)n)m] ≤ e− m300 .
Proof: Fix some item j. The probability that this item is demanded by no bidder is exactly (1−p)n.
By the chernoff bounds:
Pr[the number of items demanded by at least one bidder > (1− 1.01(1− p)n)m] ≤ e− (1−p)
nm
100 < e−
m
300
Claim 3.8 Fix some bundle S, |S| > pm
n
. Let vi be a random polar-additive valuation. With proba-
bility at least 1− e−p|S|, vi(S) ≤ 2p|S|+ 1m2 .
Proof: The probability that item j ∈ S is demanded by bidder i is p. By the chernoff bounds, the
probability that more than 2p|S| of the items will be demanded by bidder i is at most e−p|S|. The
contribution of the items that are not demanded by i is at most m · 1
m3
= 1
m2
. Therefore, in this case
vi(S) ≤ 2p|S|+ 1m2 .
Claim 3.9 There exist bidder i and v−i such that |Sv−i | > e
m
n2
10n2
.
Proof: Consider an instance where each vi is random. Denote by O the event in which the optimal
solution has value of at least m(1− 1.01(1 − p)n) > m(1− 1.01
e
). By Claim 3.7, Pr[O] ≥ 1− e− m300 .
For each i and bundle S ∈ Sv−i , |S| > pmn , denote by CiS the event in which vi(S) ≤ 2p|Si| + 1m2 .
By Claim 3.8, Pr[CiS ] ≥ 1− e−p|S|.
Assume towards a contradiction that for each bidder i and v−i, |Sv−ii | < e
m
n2
10n2
. By the union bound:
Pr[O
∧
i,S
CiS ] = 1−Pr[O
∨
i,S
CiS] > 1− (e−
m
300 +n · e
m
n2
10n2
· e−p|S|) ≥ 1− (e− m300 +n · e
m
n2
10n2
· e− mn2 ) > 1− 1
n
Thus, there exists some instance for which all the events defined above occur. Let the output of
the algorithm on this instance be (A1, . . . , An). Let T be the set of indices i for which |Ai| ≤ pmn and
let B be the set of indices for which |Ai| > pmn . The welfare of the solution produced by the algorithm
is:
Σi∈T vi(Ai) + Σi∈Bvi(Ai) ≤ n · pm
n
+Σi∈B(
2|Ai|
n
+
1
m2
) ≤ m
n
+
2m
n
+
n
m2
≤ 4m
n
where for the first inequality we use the size of Ai’s in T as an upper bound to their contribution,
and use the fact that event CiS occurs to bound the contribution of Ai’s in B. The second inequality
holds since (A1, . . . , An) is a an allocation, and thus | ∪Ai| ≤ m. The leftmost inequality holds since
m ≥ n2 (if m < n2 the statement of the theorem guarantees that A makes at one query, which is
trivially true for every algorithm with a finite approximation ratio).
Since event O occurs in this instance, the approximation ratio provided by the algorithm is at least
m(1− 1.01
e
)
4m
n
> n10 . A contradiction to the guaranteed approximation ratio.
Now we are finally ready to define the structured submenu with the required size. Take Sv−i of
size t = e
m
n2
10n2
, as guaranteed by the claim. Put the bundle S ∈ Sv−ii in bin (k, x) if |S| = k and
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x ·m 15 ≤ pS(v−i) < (x+1) ·m 15 , where x is an integer. There are m6 bins, since for each S ∈ Sv−i we
have that 0 ≤ pS(v−i) ≤ m and each bundle is of size at most m. Let S be the set of size at least tm6
that consists of all bundles in the most congested bin. Notice that S is a structured submenu. This
follows by Claim 3.6 and because all bundles in S are in the same bin: the price difference between
every two bundles in the same bin is at most m
1
5 and all bundles in the same bin have the same size.
3.2 The Optimization Lemma
Lemma 3.10 (Optimization) Let A be a truthful algorithm for combinatorial auctions with sub-
modular bidders. Let S ⊆ Rv−i be a structured submenu, for some v−i. Then, the number of value
queries A makes is at least |S| − 1.
Denote the size of all sets in S by k. Let t be greater than 2m ·m. For every S∗ ∈ S, define the
following valuation vS
∗
i of bidder i:
vS
∗
i (S) =


|S| · t, |S| < k;
k · t− 1
m4
, S ∈ S and S 6= S∗;
k · t, S = S∗ or ∃T ∈ S s.t. S strictly contains T ;
t · (k − 1
2m−|S|
), otherwise.
Claim 3.11 For every S∗, vS∗i is non-decreasing and submodular.
Proof: One can easily verify that vS
∗
i is non-decreasing. We now show that all marginal values are
non-increasing, hence the valuation is submodular. I.e., vS
∗
i (S∪{j})−vS
∗
i (S) ≤ vS
∗
i (T ∪{j})−vS
∗
i (T ),
for every T ⊆ S, j /∈ T . We divide the analysis into several simple cases:
• |S ∪ {j}| ≤ k: For every T , we have that vS∗i (T ∪ {j}) − vS
∗
i (T ) = t. On the other hand,
vS
∗
i (S ∪{j})− vS
∗
i (S) equals to either t (if S ∪{j} = S∗ or |S ∪{j}| < k), t− 1m4 or t(1− 12m−|S| )
(in the second and fourth cases in the definition of vS
∗
i ).
• |S∪{j}| > k: by the previous bullet we are left with considering bundles T such that |T | ≥ k−1.
If vS
∗
i (T ∪{j})− vS
∗
i (T ) = k · t then vS
∗
i (S ∪{j})− vS
∗
i (S) = 0, which implies that the marginal
value is non increasing. If vS
∗
i (T ∪{j}) = k · t− 1m4 , then vS
∗
i (T ∪{j})− vS
∗
i (T ) = t− 1m4 . Since
the maximum value of vS
∗
i is k · t, we have that the marginal value is non increasing in this case.
The last case we have to consider is when vS
∗
i (T ∪ {j})− vS
∗
i (T ) = t · (k− 12m−|T∪{j}| ). Consider
adding items from (S \ T ) ∪ {j} one after the other in some arbitrary order. The marginal
value of any additional item is either half of the value of the previous item (if the value of the
new bundle is determined according to the fourth case in the definition of vS
∗
i ), or exactly the
marginal value of the previous item (if this is the first bundle for which the value is k · t) or 0
(if there was a previous bundle with value k · t). In either cases the marginal value decreases, as
needed.
Below we show that when bidder i’s valuation is vS
∗
i and the other bidders’ valuations are v−i, S
∗
is his profit maximizing bundle. This implies that bidder i must be allocated the bundle S∗. However,
we show that finding S∗ cannot be done efficiently:
Claim 3.12 Finding S∗ requires |S| − 1 value queries.
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Proof: Let S′∗ be such that |S∗| = |S′∗|. Observe that the valuations vS∗i and vS
′∗
i differ only in their
value for S∗ and S′∗. Thus, a query for the value of a bundle S only tells us whether the valuation
is vSi or not. In the worst case, we have to query the value of every bundle S ∈ S (except the “last”
bundle) to determine S∗.
We are left with showing that when bidder i’s valuation is vS
∗
i then S
∗ is his profit-maximizing
bundle (notice that vS
∗
i − pv−i > 0). The proof consists of the following series of simple claims.
Claim 3.13 vS
∗
i (S
∗)−pv−i(S∗) > vS
∗
i (S)−pv−i(S), for every bundle S such that vS
∗
i (S) ≤ t ·(k− 12m ).
Proof: It suffices to show that
k · t− pv−i(S∗) > t · (k −
1
2m
)− 0
which holds if t2m > pv−i(S
∗). The claim now follows since by the properties of a structured submenu
pv−i(S
∗) ≤ m.
Claim 3.14 vS
∗
i (S
∗)− pv−i(S∗) > vS
∗
i (S)− pv−i(S), for every bundle S such that |S| > k where there
exists some T ∈ S such that T ⊆ S.
Proof: Observe that vS
∗
i (S) = v
S∗
i (S
∗) = t ·k. To finish the proof we show that pv−i(S) > pv−i(S∗).
By the properties of structured submenu, since S contains some set in S, we have that pv−i(S) >
pv−i(T ) +
1
m3
. We also have that |pv−i(S) − pv−i(S∗)| < 1m5 . This implies that pv−i(S) − pv−i(S∗) >
1
m3
− 1
m5
, as needed.
Claim 3.15 vS
∗
i (S
∗)− pv−i(S∗) > vS
∗
i (S)− pv−i(S), for every bundle S 6= S∗ such that |S| = k.
Proof: vS
∗
i (S
∗) = t · k. By the previous claims we are left with the case where vS∗i (S) = t · k − 1m4 .
By the properties of structured submenus |pv−i(T )− pv−i(S∗)| < 1m5 . The claim follows.
4 Flexible Combinatorial Public Projects
We show that every randomized universally truthful algorithm for flexible combinatorial public projects
that achieves an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ requires exponential number of value queries. The proof
is a simpler version of the result for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. We highly rec-
ommend reading Section 3 first. We prove the result for deterministic mechanisms. A lower bound of
m
1
2
−ǫ for randomized universally truthful mechanisms may be obtained as in Section A.1.
Theorem 4.1 Let A be a deterministic truthful m
1
2
−ǫ-approximation mechanism for flexible combi-
natorial public projects, for some constant ǫ > 0. Then, A makes at least e
m2ǫ
100m6
value queries.
From now on let the number of items selected in the problem to be
√
m. The proof consists of the
following lemmas.
Lemma 4.2 Let A be a truthful algorithm for extended combinatorial public projects with an approx-
imation ratio of 1
m
1
2−ǫ
, for some constant ǫ > 0. Then, there exists v−i, S, |S| ≥ e−m
2ǫ
100m6
, such that
S ⊆ Rv−i is a structured submenu.
Proof: We prove the result for the special case where we fix some bidder i and set all v ∈ v−i to
be identically zero (i.e., for every S and v ∈ v−i, v(S) = 0). A random polar-additive valuation v is
now constructed as follows: for each item j, set independently at random vi(j) = 1 with probability
p = 1√
m
or vi(j) =
1
m3
with probability 1− p.
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Definition 4.3 Fix bidder i. Let v−i be the set of valuations that are all identically zero. Let S = {S|∃
a polar-additive valuation vi s.t. A(vi, v−i)i = S}.
Claim 4.4 For every bidder i and v−i, such that each v ∈ v−i is identically 0, |S| > em
2ǫ
100 .
Proof: Let CS be the event where v(S) < m
ǫ for each bundle S ∈ S where v is a random polar-
additive valuation and ǫ > 0 is constant. By the chernoff bounds and since v is polar additive,
Pr[v(S) ≥ mǫ] ≥ 1− e−m2ǫ , where we use the fact that the probability is minimized when |S| = √m,
the maximum possible bundle size that can be selected in the problem.
Let O be the event where maxS:|S|=√m v(S) ≥
√
m
2 . By the chernoff bounds, O occurs with
probability at least 1− e−m
1
4 . Assume towards a contradiction that |S| ≤ em
2ǫ
100 . By the union bound:
Pr[O
∧
S
CS ] = 1− Pr[O
∨
S
CS ] > 1− (e−m
1
4 +
em
2ǫ
100
· e−m2ǫ) > 49
50
Thus there is an instance where all the events defined above occur simultaneously. Let S be the set
that the algorithm outputs in this instance. By definition S ∈ S. Since the event CS occurs we have
that the welfare that the algorithm provides is at most mǫ. On the other hand, the optimal solution
has a value of at least
√
m
2 , since the event O occurs. Thus the algorithm provides an approximation
ratio worse than m
1
2
−ǫ for this instance, a contradiction.
We now specify the structured submenu with the required size. Take S of size t = em
2ǫ
100 , as
guaranteed by the claim. Put the bundle S ∈ S in bin (k, x) if |S| = k and x ·m 15 ≤ pS(v−i) ≤ (x+
1) ·m 15 , where x is an integer. There are m6 bins, since for each such S we have that 0 ≤ pS(v−i) ≤ m
and the size of each bundle is at most m. Let T be the set of size at least t
m6
that consists of all
bundles in the most congested bin. Notice that T is a structured submenu. This follows by Claim 3.6
and because all bundles in T are in the same bin: the price difference between each two bundles in T
is m
1
5 and all bundles in T have the same size.
The proof of the following lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.10:
Lemma 4.5 (Optimization) Let A be a truthful algorithm for extended combinatorial public projects.
Let S ⊆ Rv−i be a structured submenu, for some v−i. A makes at least |S| − 1 value queries.
5 Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms for Exact CPP
This section shows that any truthful in expectation mechanisms for exact combinatorial public projects
that guarantees an approximation ratio better thanm
1
2
−ǫ requires exponential number of value queries.
This is the first lower bound on the power of polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanisms in
any setting. We fix the number of items selected in the problem to be
√
m. We observe that in a
truthful in expectation mechanism, prices are given to distributions and not to bundles7.
Theorem 5.1 Let A be a truthful in expectation mechanism for exact combinatorial public projects
with an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0. A makes at least em2ǫ value queries.
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix.
7Note that the natural way of normalizing prices, by setting pv
−i
(∅) = 0 does not make sense in combinatorial public
projects, where the empty bundle is never selected. Thus we set pv
−i
(D) = 0, where D is the distribution that the
algorithm outputs when the valuation of bidder i is identically zero.
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A Missing Sections and Proofs
A.1 Impossibility Results for Randomized Universally Truthful Mechanisms
We briefly sketch how to obtain impossibility results for randomized universally truthful randomized
mechanisms. We use ideas introduced in [8, 7].
Theorem A.1 Let A be a randomized universally truthful n10-approximation mechanism for com-
binatorial auctions with submodular valuations. Then, A makes at least e
m
n2
10n2·m8 value queries in
expectation.
Instead of working with randomized mechanisms that provide a good approximation ratio on all
input, it will be easier to work with deterministic mechanisms that provide a good approximation
ratio on “many” inputs. A reduction in this spirit can be obtained as follows:
Definition A.2 Fix α ≥ 1, β ∈ [0, 1], and a finite set U of instances of combinatorial auctions with
submodular bidders. A deterministic algorithm B is (α, β)-good on U if B returns an α-approximate
solution for at least a β-fraction of the instances in U .
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Proposition A.3 (essentially [8, 7]) Let U be some finite set of instances, and let γ > α ≥ 1. Let
A be a universally truthful mechanism that provides an expected welfare of OPT (I)
α
for every instance
I ∈ U with expected number of value queries val(A). Let α′ = 11
α
− 1
γ
. Then, for every τ > 1 there
is a (deterministic) algorithm in the support of A that is (α′τ, (1 − 1
τ
)/α′)-good on U and and makes
γ · val(A) value queries.
We would like to prove that there is every universally truthful randomized n10 -approximation
mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations must make exponential number
of value queries. From the proposition, using γ = m, τ = 2 and U is the set of all instances where
every valuation is polar additive, we have that there exists a ( αm
m−α ,
m−α
2αm )-good algorithm A
′ on U
that makes m · val(A) value queries. We will a lower bound on the number of value queries A′ must
make, hence we also bound the number of queries A makes. This will conclude the proof.
We show the existence of an exponentially large structured submenu in A′. We modify the proof
of Lemma 3.3 as follows. Let W be the event that the A′ provides an approximation ratio of αm
m−α on
the random instance. Observe that since A′ is ( αm
m−α ,
m−α
2αm )-good, W occurs with probability at least
m−α
2αm . In particular, for α =
n
10 , Pr[W
∧
O
∧
i,S C
i
S] > 0. The proof now continues as before to show
that A′ has a structured submenu of size e
m
n2
10n2·m6 . Lemma 3.10 shows that
e
m
n2
10n2·m6 is a lower bound
on the number of value queries that A′ makes. This implies that the number of value queries of the
randomized algorithm A is as specified.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof consists of the following lemmas.
Lemma A.4 Let A be a truthful algorithm with an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant
ǫ > 0. Fix all bidders v−i but bidder i to be identically zero. Let S be some bundle of size
√
m. There
exists a distribution D in the menu of i such that PrS∼D[|S ∩ T | > mǫ] > 1
m
1
2−ǫ
and pv−i(D) ≤
√
m.
Proof: Let vi be the valuation of bidder i with vi({j}) = 1 for every j ∈ T and vi({j}) = 0
otherwise, and for every bundle U , vi(U) = Σi∈Uvi({j}). By the guaranteed approximation ratio, A
outputs a distribution D with PrT∼D[S ∩T 6= ∅] > 1
m
1
2−ǫ
. By individual rationality we must also have
that pv−i(D) ≤
√
m.
For a bundle T , |T | = √m define the following submodular valuation, where t = m10:
vT (S) =


t · |S|, |S| < √m;
t · √m, |S ∩ T | > mǫ, |S| = √m;
t · √m, |S| > √m;
t · (|S|+ 12), otherwise.
Also define the following valuation v∅:
v∅(S) =


t · |S|, |S| < √m;
t · √m, |S| > √m;
t · (|S|+ 12), otherwise.
Lemma A.5 Every algorithm that uses value queries only makes em
2ǫ
value queries in expectation to
distinguish vT from v∅.
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Proof: Choose T uniformly at random among all bundles of size
√
m. Observe that for all bundles
S, |S| 6= √m, v∅(S) = vT (S). Thus from now on we only count queries to bundles of size
√
m. Fix
some bundle S, |S| = √m. It holds that Pr[v(S) 6= (√m + 12) · t] = Pr[S ∩ T > mǫ] < e−m
2ǫ
, where
the probability is taken over the random choice of T . Thus, for every deterministic mechanism there
is some T for which A makes at least em
2ǫ
queries. Furthermore, by Yao’s principle every randomized
mechanism makes that number of queries in expectation.
And finally:
Lemma A.6 Let A be a truthful in expectation mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of
m
1
2
−ǫ and makes at most val(A) value queries. Then, there is a mechanism that makes poly(val(A))
value queries that distinguishes vT from v∅, for every T with high probability.
Proof: Let D be the distribution that the algorithm outputs when the valuation of bidder i is vT .
Fix some bundle T , |T | = √m. Let DT be the distribution in the menu guaranteed by Lemma A.4.
We now show that PrS∼D[|S ∩ T | > mǫ] > 1m4 . Suppose not. Notice that
ES∼DT [vT (S)− pv−i(DT )] ≥ Pr
S∼DT
[|S ∩ T | > mǫ](√m · t) + Pr
S∼DT
[|S ∩ T | ≤ mǫ]((√m− 1
2
) · t)−m
≥ 1
m
1
2
−ǫ (
√
m · t) + (1− 1
m
1
2
−ǫ )((
√
m− 1
2
) · t)−√m
Where the first inequality holds since every bundle in the support of DT is of size
√
m, according to
the definition of exact combinatorial public projects. However, a similar calculation yields that
ES∼D[vT (S)− pv−i(D)] ≤ Pr
S∼D
[|S ∩ T | > mǫ](√m · t) + Pr
S∼D
[|S ∩ T | ≤ mǫ]((√m− 1
2
) · t)− 0
≤ 1
m4
(
√
m · t) + (1− 1
m4
)((
√
m− 1
2
) · t)− 0
I.e., D is less profitable thanDT , a contradiction since the algorithm outputs the distributionD. Thus,
when bidder i’s valuation is vT , A outputs some distribution D with PrS∼D[|S ∩ T | > mǫ] ≥ 1m4 .
If we run A polynomially many times (i.e., sample from D polynomially many times), we will be
able to find some set S, |S| = √m, such that |S ∩ T | > mǫ with high probability. Hence we can
distinguish vT from v∅, as needed.
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